愛華網(wǎng)Existentialism Is a Humanism
存在主義是一種人道主義
Jean PaulSartre（讓·保羅·薩特，1905一1980）
My purpose here is to offer a defence of existentialismagainst several reproaches that have been laid againstit.
在這里，我的目的是要對存在主義所受到的一些指責(zé)，提出答辯。
First, it has beenreproached as an invitation to people to dwell in quietism ofdespair. For if every way to a solution is barred, one would haveto regard any action in this world as entirely ineffective, and onewould arrive finally at a contemplative philosophy. Moreover, sincecontemplation is a luxury, this would be only another bourgeoisphilosophy. This is, especially, the reproach made by theCommunists.
首先，存在主義曾被指責(zé)為誘導(dǎo)人們安于一種絕望的無為主義。因?yàn)槿绻恳粭l解決事物之道被阻斷了，那么我們就不得不視在這世界上的任何行為都是徒勞無益的，我們最后就會(huì)走到一種瞑想的哲學(xué)里去。而更甚的是，由于瞑想是一種奢侈，因此我們的學(xué)說就不過是另一種布爾喬亞的哲學(xué)而已。在這方面，是特別受到共產(chǎn)主義者的指責(zé)。
From another quarter we arereproached for having underlined all that is ignominious in thehuman situation, for depicting what is mean, sordid or base to theneglect of certain things that possess charm and beauty and belongto the brighter side of human nature: for example, according to theCatholic critic, Mlle. Mercier, we forget how an infantsmiles.
在另一方面，我們被指責(zé)為偏重了人類處境中黯淡的一面，只看到下賤，卑鄙和低劣，而忽略了人性光明面中某些仁慈而美好的事物。例如根據(jù)天主教的批評者默契爾小姐所說，我們忘記了嬰兒是怎樣微笑的。
Both from this side and fromthe other we are also reproached for leaving out of account thesolidarity of mankind and considering man in isolation. And this,say the Communists, is because we base our doctrine upon puresubjectivity – upon the Cartesian “I think”: which is the moment inwhich solitary man attains to himself; a position from which it isimpossible to regain solidarity with other men who exist outside ofthe self. The ego cannot reach them through the cogito.
從這兩方面，我們又被指責(zé)為無見于人類的協(xié)和一致，而認(rèn)為人是處于孤立之中。共產(chǎn)主義者說我們之所以如此，主要是因?yàn)槲覀兊膶W(xué)說純粹建筑在主觀性上——建筑在笛卡爾所謂“我思”這個(gè)觀念之上：這是孤立的人面對他們的時(shí)刻，這是一個(gè)無法和其他存在于自我之外的人取得協(xié)和一致的地位。自我不能透過思維而與他們相通。
From the Christian side, weare reproached as people who deny the reality and seriousness ofhuman affairs. For since we ignore the commandments of God and allvalues prescribed as eternal, nothing remains but what is strictlyvoluntary. Everyone can do what he likes, and will be incapable,from such a point of view, of condemning either the point of viewor the action of anyone else.
從基督教這一面，我們則被指責(zé)為否定了人事的真實(shí)和嚴(yán)肅。因?yàn)槲覀兒鲆暳松系鄣恼]言和他規(guī)定的所有的永恒價(jià)值，那就除了自由意愿之外，別無所有了。每一個(gè)人都可以為所欲為，從這一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)來看，就不能譴責(zé)他人的觀點(diǎn)和行為了。
It is to these various reproaches that I shall endeavour toreply today; that is why I have entitled this brief exposition“Existentialism is a Humanism.” Many may be surprised at themention of humanism in this connection, but we shall try to see inwhat sense we understand it. In any case, we can begin by sayingthat existentialism, in our sense of the word, is a doctrine thatdoes render human life possible; a doctrine, also, which affirmsthat every truth and every action imply both an environmental and ahuman subjectivity.
今天，我將盡量來答復(fù)這些不同的指責(zé)。這也就是我為什么把這短文題為“存在主義是一種人道主義”的理由。許多人對于我在這里提到“人道主義”一詞，可能會(huì)感到驚訝，但是我將試圖尋出我們所了解的意義。無論如何，我們一開始就可以說，我們所意指的存在主義，乃是使人生成為可能的一種學(xué)說；這種學(xué)說并宣稱任何真理和行為都包含著環(huán)境和人的主觀性。
The essential charge laid against us is, of course, that ofover-emphasis upon the evil side of human life. I have lately beentold of a lady who, whenever she lets slip a vulgar expression in amoment of nervousness, excuses herself by exclaiming, “I believe Iam becoming an existentialist.” So it appears that ugliness isbeing identified with existentialism. That is why some people saywe are “naturalistic,” and if we are, it is strange to see how muchwe scandalise and horrify them, for no one seems to be muchfrightened or humiliated nowadays by what is properly callednaturalism. Those who can quite well keep down a novel by Zola suchas La Terre are sickened as soon as they read an existentialistnovel. Those who appeal to the wisdom of the people – which is asad wisdom – find ours sadder still. And yet, what could be moredisillusioned幻想破滅的than suchsayings as “Charity begins at home” or “Promote a rogue and he’llsue you for damage, knock him down and he’ll do youhomage”?
對于我們最基本的攻擊，當(dāng)然是說我們過份強(qiáng)調(diào)了人生的罪惡面。最近有人告訴我一個(gè)故事，說有一位太太，無論在什么時(shí)候，只要她神經(jīng)過敏地說了一句粗俗的話，就自我解嘲地叫道：“我想我要變成一個(gè)存在主義者了?！庇纱丝梢钥闯觯髳罕灰暈榇嬖谥髁x的同義詞了。這也就是為什么有些人說我們是“自然主義的”，假使我們是自然主義者的話，這倒奇怪了，因?yàn)榻裉煳覀儏s比名符其實(shí)的自然主義者更使他們感到震驚和畏懼。那些可以安然讀完一本象左拉的《大地》那樣的小說的人，卻無法忍受存在主義者的小說。那些訴諸于大眾智慧的人——那是一種悲哀的智慧——發(fā)現(xiàn)我們的更為悲哀。然而，又有什么話比說“仁愛始于家庭”或者“升擢歹徒，他會(huì)反咬；將他擊倒，他則崇拜”更會(huì)使人感到嗒然若喪呢？
We all know how many common sayings can be quoted to thiseffect, and they all mean much the same – that you must not opposethe powers that be; that you must not fight against superior force;must not meddle管閑事in matters thatare above your station. Or that any action not in accordance withsome tradition is mere romanticism; or that any undertaking whichhas not the support of proven experience is foredoomed tofrustration; and that since experience has shown men to beinvariably inclined to evil, there must be firm rules to restrainthem, otherwise we shall have anarchy. It is, however, the peoplewho are forever mouthing these dismal proverbs and, whenever theyare told of some more or less repulsive action, say “How like humannature!” – it is these very people, alwaysharping嘮叨upon realism, who complain that existentialism is toogloomy a view of things. Indeed their excessive protests make mesuspect that what is annoying them is not so much our pessimism,but, much more likely, our optimism. For at bottom, what isalarming in the doctrine that I am about to try to explain to youis – is it not? – that it confronts man with a possibility ofchoice. To verify this, let us review the whole question upon thestrictly philosophic level. What, then, is this that we callexistentialism?
我們都很熟習(xí)許多可以這樣引用的老話，它們的意義大抵相同—— 你不可反抗現(xiàn)實(shí)，你不可違反權(quán)威，你不可逾越本份，干涉他人?；蛘哒f，任何不依從一些傳統(tǒng)的行為都只是浪漫主義；或者說不根據(jù)過去經(jīng)驗(yàn)的行為，都注定要失敗的；并且由于經(jīng)驗(yàn)顯示出人總是不變地傾向于罪惡，所以必須有嚴(yán)厲的規(guī)則來約束，否則我們就要陷入無政府狀態(tài)了。然而，直到現(xiàn)在仍然有人咀嚼著這些喪氣的老話，每當(dāng)他們聽到一些討厭的行為時(shí)，就會(huì)說：“多么象人性呀！”——就是這些重彈現(xiàn)實(shí)主義老調(diào)的人，在抱怨存在主義對事物的看法太過于陰郁。的確，他們那些過度的抗議倒使我懷疑觸怒他們的不是我們的悲觀，而是我們的樂觀。因?yàn)樽犯康?，在我正要向你們解釋的學(xué)說之中振聾發(fā)聵之點(diǎn)在于：人有選擇的可能性，難道不是嗎？為證實(shí)這點(diǎn)，我們必須在純哲學(xué)的水準(zhǔn)上，把它重新研究一番。那就是我們稱為存在主義的這個(gè)名詞，到底是什么？
Most of those who are makinguse of this word would be highly confused if required to explainits meaning. For since it has become fashionable, people cheerfullydeclare that this musician or that painter is “existentialist.” Acolumnist in Clartes signs himself “The Existentialist,” and,indeed, the word is now so loosely applied to so many things thatit no longer means anything at all. It would appear that, for thelack of any novel doctrine such as that of surrealism, all thosewho are eager to join in the latest scandal or movement now seizeupon this philosophy in which, however, they can find nothing totheir purpose. For in truth this is of all teachings the leastscandalous and the most austere: it is intended strictly fortechnicians and philosophers. All the same, it can easily bedefined.
對大多數(shù)正在使用這個(gè)名詞的人，如果請他說明一下它的意義，一定總會(huì)感到極其含混不清。因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在它已經(jīng)成為一種流行的字眼，人們常興之所至地稱呼這個(gè)音樂家或者那個(gè)畫家是“存在主義者”。一位《光明報(bào)》的專欄作家竟自己簽名為“存在主義者”，然而，事實(shí)上，這個(gè)名詞現(xiàn)在被廣泛地使用于眾多的事情，以致它已不再具有任何意義了。似乎是由于缺乏一種類似于超寫實(shí)主義的先鋒學(xué)說，所以那些渴求使人驚駭與激動(dòng)事件的人，都皈依于存在主義這種哲學(xué)。實(shí)際上，在我們的學(xué)說里，他們找不出有什么能滿足于他們的目標(biāo)的。因?yàn)槭聦?shí)上這在所有的學(xué)說中是最少驚駭和最為嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)模核菍閷＜液驼軐W(xué)家而建的一種學(xué)說。但是，它是易于界說的。
The question is onlycomplicated because there are two kinds of existentialists. Thereare, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall nameJaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on theother the existential atheists, amongst whom we must placeHeidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. Whatthey have in common is simply the fact that they believe thatexistence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we mustbegin from the subjective. What exactly do we mean bythat?
這問題只有一點(diǎn)復(fù)雜之處，乃是因?yàn)榇嬖谥髁x者有兩派所致。一派是基督教，其中我將舉出雅斯培與蓋布里奧·馬塞爾，這兩人都自稱為天主教徒。另一派則是無神論的存在主義，其中我們必須舉出海德格和法國的存在主義者以及我自己。他們的共同點(diǎn)則是他們都認(rèn)為存在先于本質(zhì)——或者，如果你喜歡的話，也可以說是：主體必須作為一切的起點(diǎn)。我們所意指的確切意義是什么呢？
If one considers an articleof manufacture as, for example, a book or a paper-knife – one seesthat it has been made by an artisan who had a conception of it; andhe h as paid attention, equally, to the conception of a paper-knifeand to the pre-existent technique of production which is a part ofthat conception and is, at bottom, a formula. Thus the paper-knifeis at the same time an article producible in a certain manner andone which, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose, for onecannot suppose that a man would produce a paper-knife withoutknowing what it was for. Let us say, then, of the paperknife thatits essence – that is to say the sum of the formulae and thequalities which made its production and its definition possible –precedes its existence. The presence of such-and-such a paper-knifeor book is thus determined before my eyes. Here, then, we areviewing the world from a technical standpoint, and we can say thatproduction precedes existence.
如果人們研究一件工業(yè)制品——譬如說一本書或者切紙刀——人們就可以了解，制造它的工匠必定先有關(guān)于它的概念存乎心中。同樣地，他曾對切紙刀的概念以及先于存在的制作技巧加以注意過。這種制作的技巧是那概念的一部分，實(shí)際上，也就是定則。因此，切紙刀就成了在某種一定方法之下所制成的東西。而在另一方面它又可以有某種特定的用途，因?yàn)槲覀儾荒芟胂褚粋€(gè)人會(huì)制造一把切紙刀而不知道它的用途的。所以，對于這把切紙刀，我們可以說它的本質(zhì)——也就是使它可能被制作出來以及具有意義的這種定則與性質(zhì)之總和——先于它的存在。這類的切紙刀或書本就這樣注定了地呈現(xiàn)于我們的眼前。在這里，我們是以一種技術(shù)的觀點(diǎn)來觀察這個(gè)世界，所以，我們可以說制作先于存在。
When we think of God as thecreator, we are thinking of him, most of the time, as a supernalartisan. Whatever doctrine we may be considering, whether it be adoctrine like that of Descartes, or of Leibniz himself, we alwaysimply that the will follows, more or less, from the understandingor at least accompanies it, so that when God creates he knowsprecisely what he is creating. Thus, the conception of man in themind of God is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind ofthe artisan: God makes man according to a procedure and aconception, exactly as the artisan manufactures a paper-knife,following a definition and a formula. Thus each individual man isthe realisation of a certain conception which dwells in the divineunderstanding.
當(dāng)我們把上帝視為造物者時(shí)，大部分的時(shí)候，我們都把他當(dāng)作超級(jí)的工匠。無論我們考慮哪一種學(xué)說，不管是笛卡兒的，或者萊布尼茲的，我們多少總認(rèn)為理念先于意志，或者兩者是伴生關(guān)系，所以上帝造物的時(shí)候，他是確切地知道他正在創(chuàng)造什么。因此，上帝心中人的概念亦如工匠心中切紙刀的概念。上帝根據(jù)一種程序和概念造人，恰像工匠依照一個(gè)定義和公式造切紙刀。所以，每一個(gè)個(gè)別的人都是上帝睿智中某一個(gè)概念的實(shí)現(xiàn)。
In the philosophic atheismof the eighteenth century, the notion of God is suppressed, butnot, for all that, the idea that essence is prior to existence;something of that idea we still find everywhere, in Diderot, inVoltaire and even in Kant. Man possesses a human nature; that“human nature,” which is the conception of human being, is found inevery man; which means that each man is a particular example of auniversal conception, the conception of Man. In Kant, thisuniversality goes so far that the wild man of the woods, man in thestate of nature and the bourgeois are all contained in the samedefinition and have the same fundamental qualities. Here again, theessence of man precedes that historic existence which we confrontin experience.
在十八世紀(jì)的無神論哲學(xué)中，上帝這個(gè)觀念被拋棄了，但是并沒有拋棄本質(zhì)先于存在的想法。這種想法仍然到處可見，在狄德羅，伏爾泰甚至康德的學(xué)說中，都可以找到這種思想的存在。人具有人性，這種“人性”乃是人的概念，在每一個(gè)人身上都可以發(fā)現(xiàn)得到，這也就是每一個(gè)人都是這種普遍概念的一個(gè)個(gè)別的例子。在康德的思想中這種普遍性是如此的廣泛，以致森林中的野人，即還處于原始狀態(tài)中的人，以及布爾喬亞階級(jí)的人都包括到這同樣的定義中去，而且具有相同的基本性質(zhì)。在這里又和上面一樣，人的本質(zhì)先于我們在經(jīng)驗(yàn)中所遭逢到的歷史存在。
Atheistic existentialism, ofwhich I am a representative, declares with greater consistency thatif God does not exist there is at least one being whose existencecomes before its essence, a being which exists before it can bedefined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heideggerhas it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existenceprecedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encountershimself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards.If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it isbecause to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything untillater, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there isno human nature, because there is no God to have a conception ofit. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himselfto be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself afteralready existing – as he wills to be after that leap towardsexistence.
無神論的存在主義，我就是一個(gè)代表，極為一致地宣稱，如果上帝不存在，那么至少有一種東西它的存在是先于它的本質(zhì)的，它是在可能被任何概念所界定以前就已存在了的，這樣的東西，就是人，也就是如海德格所說的人的實(shí)在性。我們所說的存在先于本質(zhì)到底是什么意思呢？我們的意思是：人首先存在著，首先碰到各種際遇，首先活動(dòng)于這世界——然后，開始定義自己。若依存在主義者看來，一個(gè)人如果無法予以定義，那是因?yàn)槿酥?，是空無所有。只是到了后來，他才成為某種東西，他才把自己創(chuàng)造成他所要成為的東西。因此，就無所謂人的本性，因?yàn)闆]有上帝來給予它一個(gè)概念。人赤裸裸地存在著，他躍進(jìn)存在之后，他才意欲自己成為什么東西。
Man is nothing else but thatwhich he makes of himself. That is the first principle ofexistentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,”using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to sayby this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or atable? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that man is,before all else, something which propels itself towards a futureand is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project whichpossesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or afungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothingexists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will onlyattain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however,what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishingor willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not– after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join aparty, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what isusually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior andmore spontaneous decision. If, however, it is true that existenceis prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, thefirst effect of existentialism is that it puts every man inpossession of himself as he is, and places the entireresponsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do notmean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, butthat he is responsible for all men.
人，不外是由自己造成的東西。這是存在主義的第一個(gè)原則。也就是人們所說的主觀性，他們用這個(gè)字來譴責(zé)我們。但是我們這樣說的意思，還不是指人比一塊石頭或者一張桌子更為尊嚴(yán)？因?yàn)椋覀冋f，“人首先是存在著”，這意思就是說，人首先是一種把自己推向?qū)淼拇嬖谖?，并且覺識(shí)到自己把自己想像成未來的存在。人確實(shí)是一種有自覺生命的設(shè)計(jì)，而不是青苔，蘭花，或是花椰菜。在這個(gè)自我設(shè)計(jì)之先，無物存在。即使在睿智的上天也沒有。人只有在他計(jì)劃成為什么時(shí)才能獲得存在。只是希望，還不夠。因?yàn)椤跋Ｍ被蛘摺耙庠浮币辉~，通常是指一種在我們已塑造出我們自己之后所作的一種自覺決定。我們可以希望加入一個(gè)政黨，寫一本書，或是結(jié)婚——但是在這些情形下，通常所謂“我的意愿”可能是一種較早的和較自發(fā)的決定的表現(xiàn)。然而，假如存在先于本質(zhì)是真實(shí)的話，人就要對他自己負(fù)責(zé)。因此，存在主義的第一個(gè)作用是它使每一個(gè)人主宰他自己，把他存在的責(zé)任全然放在他自己的肩膀上。由是，當(dāng)我們說人對他的本質(zhì)負(fù)責(zé)時(shí)，我們并不只是說他對他個(gè)人負(fù)責(zé)而已，而是對所有的人負(fù)責(zé)。
